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UPCOMING POLICY BRIEFS . . 
INTRODUCTION
The notion of school choice is over 200
years old. In 1776, Adam Smith first pub-
lished The Wealth of Nations and suggested
that “schools could reach a higher quality
of education by allowing students to
choose their own teachers and schools
…[asserting] that if a school’s enrollment
began to diminish drastically, the school
would be forced to emulate the popular
schools and offer high quality education”
(Smith, 1999). In recent history, Nobel lau-
reate Milton Friedman helped to renew
popular interest in school choice through
the publication of the article, “The Role of
Government in Education,” and subse-
quent founding of the Friedman Founda-
tion for Educational Choice (Smith, 1999).
Friedman suggested that by granting fami-
lies choices in education, both schools and
education would improve.
This year Indiana joined over a dozen other
states in adopting Friedman’s principles by
passing what many believe to be the most
comprehensive school choice program in
the country. With the enactment of three
key bills (HEA 1001, HEA 1003, and HEA
1004), Indiana parents may now take
advantage of a school expenditure tax
deduction, school scholarships granted
from private Scholarship Granting Organi-
zations (SGOs) which are incentivized
with a tax credit, and Choice Scholarships
(generally referred to as vouchers) granted
to low-income parents and funded by the
state of Indiana. This Education Policy
Brief will examine the legal, fiscal, and
policy ramifications of Indiana’s school
choice offerings, particularly the new
Choice Scholarship program. 
SCHOOL EXPENDITURE 
DEDUCTION
Although Choice Scholarships are only
granted to low-income families, all taxpay-
ers with dependent children can benefit
from the new School Expenditure Deduc-
tion. The School Expenditure Deduction
allows a taxpayer who has an eligible
dependent child to take a tax deduction
against her adjusted gross income for unre-
imbursed education expenditures made in
connection with enrollment, attendance, or
participation of the child in a private school
education program or for expenses accrued
in home schooling the child (IND CODE §
6-3-2-22). A child is “eligible” if he or she
is eligible for a free elementary or high
school education in an Indiana school cor-
poration (IND CODE § 6-3-2-22(a)). The
term “education expenditures” includes
items such as tuition at a private school,
computer software, textbooks, workbooks,
curricula, and school supplies (IND CODE
§ 6-3-2-22(2)). The deduction is limited to
$1,000 multiplied by the number of depen-
dent children for whom the taxpayer made
education expenditures (IND CODE § 6-3-
2-22(3)(d)). The Indiana Legislative Ser-
vice Agency estimates that the revenue loss
to the state from this deduction could poten-
tially range from $3.3 M to $3.7 M annually
(Legislative Service Agency, 2011). 
SCHOOL SCHOLARSHIP TAX 
CREDIT
Indiana School Scholarship Tax Credits,
first passed in 2009, provide a mechanism
for students to acquire privately funded
scholarships to attend private schools
through the assistance of Scholarship
Granting Organizations (SGOs). SGOs are
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non-profit organizations authorized by the
state of Indiana to receive donations from
any individual or entity (IND CODE § 6-
3.1-30.5-12). Individuals and entities who
donate to SGOs can claim a credit against
state tax liability equal to 50 percent of their
contribution to the SGO. The donations
received by SGOs are used to grant scholar-
ships to legal residents of Indiana who are
between the ages of 5 and 22 during the
year in which the scholarship is utilized
(IND CODE § 20-51-1-4.5(1)-(2)). SGOs
are allowed to set their own requirements
and application processes, but they may not
limit the availability of scholarships to stu-
dents of only one participating school (IND
CODE § 20-51-1-7(2)). The application
process must be fair and neutral, and chil-
dren who are members of families which
have incomes of more than 150 percent of
the free or reduced lunch levels as estab-
lished by the federal government are not
eligible (IND CODE § 20-51-1-4.5(4)).
Students seeking scholarships must have
been or plan to be enrolled in an accredited
school (IND CODE § 20-51-1-4.5(3)). The
scholarships may only be used at schools
that are located in Indiana; require an eligi-
ble individual to pay tuition or transfer
tuition to attend; voluntarily agree to enroll
an eligible individual; are accredited by a
state, regional, or federal agency recognized
by the Indiana State Board of Education;
administer the ISTEP+; and are not a charter
school or the school corporation in which an
eligible individual is a legal resident (IND
CODE § 20-51-1-4.7). In addition to better
defining the eligibility requirements for
schools and students seeking school choice
funds, the 2011 legislative session also
increased the annual limit on the amount of
tax credits allowed each year from $2.5 mil-
lion to $5 million during (IND CODE § 6-
3.1-30.5-13). Although the annual limit on
the amount of tax credits allowed has been
increased, it is notable that the Department
of Revenue only granted approximately
$340,000 of the available $2.5 million in
credits for fiscal year 2011 (Legislative Ser-
vice Agency, 2011).
No public money ever directly flows to fam-
ilies or schools when a scholarship is
granted by a SGO. The donor’s funds are
given to the SGO before the funds ever
become part of the state treasury (see Kot-
terman v. Killian). Tax credits given by the
state of Indiana for donation to SGOs are
similar to tax credits granted by the state of
Indiana for a number of other programs (see
Table 1 for a sampling of current Indiana tax
credit programs). In fact, in 2007, the state
of Indiana allowed $2,232,136 in Neighbor-
hood Assistance Credits (a program which
funds both secular and sectarian organiza-
tions in a neutral manner) and allowed over
$26,000,000 in personal income tax credits
for College Choice 529 Savings Plans (also
a program where funds are diverted to both
secular and sectarian postsecondary educa-
tion organizations in a neutral manner). The
use of tax credits to incentivize behavior is
a relatively common and much debated
practice utilized in both state and federal tax
structures. For a detailed discussion on the
policies behind the use of tax credits gener-
ally see The Dual Subsidy Theory of Chari-
table Deductions, 84 Ind. L.J. 1047, Fall
2009 (Benshalom, 2009). 
CHOICE SCHOLARSHIPS
Although School Scholarship Tax Credits
existed prior to the 2011 legislative ses-
sion, school vouchers, or Choice Scholar-
ships, were a significant addition to
Indiana school choice statutes. The Fried-
man Foundation for Educational Choice
cites Indiana’s new voucher program as the
largest in the nation due to its broad eligi-
bility (Enlow, 2011).
The student eligibility for Choice Scholar-
ships parallels the eligibility described
above for Scholarship Tax Credits (IND
CODE § 20-51-1-4.5(4)). After choosing a
school for her child, a parent must endorse
the Choice Scholarship distribution from
the Indiana Department of Education
(IDOE) before the funds may be used by
the chosen school. Schools receiving
Choice Scholarship funds must meet spe-
cific requirements and adhere to certain
guidelines in order to be eligible to receive
funds.
Indiana Code § 20-51-4-1(a) dictates cur-
ricular standards for schools receiving
Choice Scholarship funds while also
explicitly prohibiting expanded regulation
of private schools. The provision expressly
seeks to protect the autonomy of the pri-
vate schools, but provides a list of 15 doc-
uments such as the Constitution of the
United States, the Pledge of Allegiance,
and the Constitution of the State of Indiana
(IND CODE § 20-51-4-1(b)) that eligible
schools are barred from censoring and
required to make available in school librar-
ies (IND CODE § 20-51-4-1(d-e)). Eligi-
ble schools must allow students to freely 
  
TABLE 1.  Indiana Tax Credits.
Dynamic State Tax 
Reduction in 2007 Amount of Tax Credit Cap Misc.
Neighborhood Assistance Credit; 
IND CODE §6-3.1-9
$2,232,136 50% of Donation $2,500,000 Funds can be used by 
religious organizations
Unified Tax Credit for the Elderly; 
IND Code § 6-3-3-9
$6,907,760 $40 to $100 per taxpayer depending 
on income
None
Lake County Residential Income Tax Credit; 
IND CODE §6-3.1-20-4
$6,888,233 The lesser of $300 or total amount 
of property tax liability
None
IN College Choice 529 Savings Plan Credit
IND CODE § 6-3-3-12
$26,001,627 20% of contribution to savings plan None Funds can be used on 
religious organizations
Source: Indiana State Budget Agency Tax & Revenue Division, 2010.
.
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reference these documents, allow an
opportunity to recite the Pledge of Alle-
giance, and display the United States flag
in each classroom (IND CODE § 20-51-4-
1(f)). 
For students in middle and high schools,
eligible schools must, within two weeks
before a general election, provide five class
periods of discussion on the systems of
government of Indiana and the United
States, methods of voting, election laws,
party structures, and the responsibilities of
citizen participation in elections (IND
CODE § 20-51-4-1(f)(6)). Eligible schools
are also required to provide instruction on
honesty, morality, courtesy, obedience to
law, respect for the flags and constitutions
of Indiana and the United States, respect
for parents, the dignity of honest labor, and
other lessons that develop an “upright and
desirable citizenry,” respecting other’s
property, and respecting the rights of others
to hold their own views and religious
beliefs (IND CODE § 20-51-4-1(f)(7-8)).
More broadly, eligible schools are held to a
basic curricular standard which includes
instruction in English, world languages,
mathematics, social studies, sciences, fine
arts, and health education (IND CODE §
20-51-4-1(f)(9). Lastly, eligible schools
are prohibited from teaching about the vio-
lent overthrow of the United States govern-
ment (IND CODE § 20-51-4-1(g)). The
IDOE will be required to visit at least five
percent of eligible schools through random
selection to check for compliance (Legisla-
tive Services Agency, 2011).
Indiana will phase in the distribution of
Choice Scholarships among eligible stu-
dents. In the 2011-12 school year, the IDOE
may award only 7,500 Choice Scholarships
among eligible students, and in the 2012-13
school year, only 15,000 Choice Scholar-
ships may be awarded. Choice Scholarships
are not limited in subsequent school years
(IND CODE § 20-51-4-2(b)).
The IDOE must establish procedures for
awarding funds to eligible students, but the
amount of the Choice Scholarship for each
student must be less than the state tuition
support amount per student received by
each school corporation. Choice Scholar-
ships are capped at the lesser of three
amounts 1) the sum of tuition, transfer
tuition, and fees an eligible student would
be required to pay to attend an eligible
school (IND CODE § 20-51-4-4(1)); 2)
$4,500 for students in grades 1-8; or 3) 90
percent of the state tuition support amount
if the eligible student is in a household with
an annual income equal to the requirement
for the federal free and reduced lunch pro-
gram, or 50 percent of the state tuition sup-
port amount for a student in a household
with an income no more than 150 percent
of the qualification for the free and reduced
lunch program (IND CODE § 20-51-4-
4(2)). If an eligible student enrolls in an eli-
gible school for only part of the school
year, the Choice Scholarship will be
reduced on a prorated basis. An eligible
student is entitled to only one Choice
Scholarship per school year (IND CODE §
20-51-4-6). The amount of the Choice
Scholarship is not considered income for
the purposes of other federal or state grants
or programs (IND CODE § 20-51-4-11).
All schools participating 
in the Choice Scholarship 
program must submit 




Eligible schools are broadly prohibited
from discriminating based on race, color,
or national origin, and eligible schools
must especially abide by their individual
admission policies without discrimination
when considering students who apply for
and are awarded Choice Scholarships (IND
CODE § 20-51-4-3(a-b)). If an eligible
school receives more applications than
Choice Scholarships available to the
school, then the school must draw eligible
students at random from the pool of appli-
cants at a public meeting (IND CODE §
20-51-4-3(c)). 
In order to be eligible for a Choice Schol-
arship, a student must also have either been
enrolled in a school corporation that did
not charge the individual transfer tuition
for at least two semesters immediately pre-
ceding the first semester for which the indi-
vidual receives a choice scholarship, or
must have received a scholarship from a
scholarship granting organization under IC
20-51-3 or a Choice Scholarship under IC
20-51-4 in a preceding school year (IND
CODE § 20-51-1-4.5(5)(A)-(B)).
All schools participating in the Choice
Scholarship program must submit data for
category placement under Indiana’s
accountability system. If an eligible school
is placed in one of the two lowest catego-
ries for two consecutive years, the IDOE
will suspend Choice Scholarships to new
students for the struggling school for a
period of one year. If an eligible school is
placed in either of the two lowest catego-
ries for three consecutive years, the IDOE
will suspend Choice Scholarships to new
students until the school is placed in the
middle or higher categories for two consec-
utive years, and if the eligible school is
placed in the lowest category for three con-
secutive years, the IDOE will suspend
Choice Scholarships until the school is
placed in the middle or higher categories
for three consecutive years. Eligible stu-
dents already attending the school may
continue to receive Choice Scholarships
(IND CODE § 20-51-4-9(a)).
VOUCHER FUNDING
The fiscal impact statement for the Choice
Scholarship legislation (HEA 1003-2011)
states that the impact on state tuition sup-
port expenses from the Choice Scholarship
program are indeterminable (Legislative
Services Agency, 2011); however, due to
the language of HEA 1003, it is possible to
estimate the funding levels of the Choice
Scholarships compared to public schools
funding.
The Legislative Services Agency (LSA)
estimated the tuition support amount that
would be used to pay for Choice Scholar-
ships based on a student cohort sample of
1,000. Table 2 summarizes LSA’s calcula-
tions. Since a maximum of 7,500 students
may be awarded a Choice Scholarship dur-
ing the 2011-12 school year by taking
LSA’s cohort sample of 1,000 and multiply-
ing it by 7.5, a maximum of $21,936,240
could be spent on Choice Scholarships in
the 2011-12 school year (approximately
0.35 percent of the total estimated appropri-
ation for tuition support in the 2012 calen-
dar year). Likewise, since a maximum of
15,000 Choice Scholarships can be
awarded in the 2012-13 school year by tak-
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ing LSA’s cohort sample of 1,000 and mul-
tiplying by 15, a maximum of $43,872,480
could be spent (approximately 0.69 percent
of the total estimated appropriation for
tuition support in the 2013 calendar year). 
As mentioned above, after the 2012-13
school year, there will be no cap on the
number of Choice Scholarships that can be
distributed, but based on the student popu-
lation during the 2009-10 school year and
the Legislative Services Agency’s projec-
tions for the number of students who will
be in the necessary income ranges, an esti-
mated 505,083 students will be eligible for
Choice Scholarships during the 2012-13
school year (Indiana Department of Educa-
tion, 2011a). It is important to bear in mind
that it is highly unlikely the number of stu-
dents receiving Choice Scholarships will
approach this amount in the near future due
to a lack of seats available at eligible pri-
vate schools, among other factors. Further,
even if enrollment in the Choice Scholar-
ship program approached 500,000 or
beyond, the state’s cost per student in pro-
viding a Choice Scholarship will always be
less than the state’s cost to educate the stu-
dent in the public school because of the
structure of Indiana’s Choice Scholarship
legislation. In short, despite arguments to
the contrary, the structure of Indiana’s
Choice Scholarship program is projected to
save the state of Indiana money. 
Theoretically, when school choice pro-
grams are structured in a way in which dol-
lars follow students whether the student is
attending a public or private school, and
the state is granting scholarships to stu-
dents in an amount less than it costs the
state to educate the student in a public
school, the state should save money. How-
ever, to date, the school choice programs
have not strictly followed the funds-to-fol-
low-student model and, as such, informa-
tion on true cost savings for the state are
inconclusive. Here, two prominent school
voucher programs will be examined for
their funding mechanisms and their fiscal
impacts.
A 2006 study by Susan Aud and Leon
Michos examined the fiscal impact of
Washington, D.C.,’s program. The D.C.
voucher program is unique from other state
and local programs because although the
majority of revenue for D.C. Public
Schools (DCPS) comes from local sources,
the voucher program is funded by the fed-
eral government. Due to how the city of
Washington, D.C., utilizes general funding
formulas for DCPS, DCPS loses city funds
each time a student chooses to participate
in the voucher program, while the city
saves money. A $13 million grant from the
federal government mitigates DCPS’s bud-
get shortfall from the exiting students and
also gives DCPS a savings in the years
when the revenue loss from students
departing with vouchers is less than $13
million. Aud and Michos’s study shows the
voucher program saved the city approxi-
mately $8 million due to the reduced num-
ber of students in the schools and saved
DCPS $5 million due to the federal grant.
Although, Aud and Michos note, due to the
grant, per-pupil funding actually increased
in DCPS, negating any potential competi-
tive effects of having a voucher program.
Because DCPS did not face any budgetary
consequences of parent choice, it had no
incentive to better manage finances or
improve education (Aud & Michos, 2006).
A second voucher model, the Milwaukee
Public Schools (MPS) voucher program,
was established in 1991. Although it has
been amended since it was originally
passed, the funding formula associated
with MPS currently ensures that state funds
allocated to MPS directly correlate to the
number of students enrolled in MPS.
Therefore, as students accept vouchers and
choose to use them in private schools, MPS
loses money. 
The Wisconsin legislature tried to mitigate
this loss of funds by allowing the city of
Milwaukee the option of increasing prop-
erty taxes to supplement funds streaming to
MPS. As a result, Milwaukee property tax-
payers pay twice for the expense of
voucher students while taxpayers outside
   
TABLE 2. Costs of Choice Scholarships as Estimated by the Legislative Services Agency
Household Income Scholarship Level Scholarship Amount 
(assuming a $5,515 
tuition support amount)
Students in Income 
Range out of 1,000 
Student Samplea 
Tuition Support Used for 
Scholarships
Grades 1-8
Max. 100% free/reduced 
lunch income level
90% of tuition support $4,500 341 $1,534,500
Max. 150% free/reduced 
lunch income level
50% of tuition support $2,758 141 $388,808
Grades 9-12s
Max. 100% free/reduced 
lunch income level
90% of tuition support $4,964 164 $814,014
Max. 150% free/reduced 
lunch income level
50% of tuition support $2,758 68 $187,510
TOTAL $2,924,832
a The remaining 286 of the 1,000 in the cohort sample are not eligible for Choice Scholarships.
Source: Legislative Services Agency, 2011.
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of Milwaukee benefit as their per-pupil
spending increases. Per-pupil spending
increases outside of Milwaukee because
the state spends less on a voucher for a Mil-
waukee student than it would have spent on
educating that child in MPS and those sav-
ings are distributed throughout the state
rather than kept in MPS (Costrell, 2009).
As is the case in Washington, D.C.,
because Milwaukee is allowed to increase
property taxes to mitigate the loss in reve-
nue from exiting students, the effects of
competition and incentives to make MPS
more efficient and effective are hindered. 
Indiana’s school choice statutes’ funding
structure is similar to Wisconsin’s in that it
allows state dollars to “follow students.” In
other words, when a student chooses to use
one of Indiana’s school choice options, the
school from which the student came loses
per-pupil funding for that student. Because
the amount of money the state spends on
Choice Scholarships is less than the
amount of money the state would spend to
educate that child in the public school, the
result is a net savings for the state. How-
ever, unlike Milwaukee, some local Indi-
ana school corporations will see a loss of
revenue as students choose private schools.
Indiana’s private schools are not evenly
distributed throughout the state; therefore,
funding shifts will not be distributed
evenly throughout the state. A review of
the IDOE’s listing of private schools in
Indiana reveals approximately 242 private
schools, concentrated mostly around urban
areas such as Indianapolis, northwest Indi-
ana, Ft. Wayne, and Evansville (Indiana
Department of Education, 2011b). School
corporations in these areas will more likely
see decreased total revenues as students
leave the public schools for private
schools, as opposed to rural school corpo-
rations where access to private schools is
more limited. These schools should, how-
ever, also see decreased expenses as they
are responsible for the education of fewer
students. It is important to note that under
Indiana’s program, although a school cor-
poration’s total revenue may decrease due
to vouchers, the per-pupil state tuition sup-
port would not decrease.
Indiana presents a particularly unique fis-
cal situation because its school choice stat-
utes aspire to execute both school vouchers
(Choice Scholarships) and school tax cred-
its. The Cato Institute has expressed con-
cern that vouchers combined with the
tuition tax credit would erase any budget-
ary savings of one program or the other
executed in solitude: “As written, the [Indi-
ana] program could have a significant neg-
ative impact on state finances if families
claim both the vouchers and funds from the
state’s existing education tax credits…
Critics of expanding educational freedom
always claim, incorrectly, that school
choice programs are a drain on public
resources. But the double-dipping that is
allowed under this program could inadver-
tently prove them right” (Schaeffer, 2011).
As the IDOE moves forward with imple-
mentation of the Indiana’s comprehensive
plan, it is necessary to keep a watchful eye
on the prevalence of “double-dipping.”
LEGAL ISSUES
“In the absence of a constitutional
violation, the desirability and effi-
cacy of school choice are matters to
be resolved through the political pro-
cess. This program may be wise or
unwise, provident or improvident
from an educational or public policy
viewpoint. Our individual prefer-
ences, however, are not the constitu-
tional standard.”
The Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jackson v. Benson
578 N.E.2d 602, 610 (Wisc. 1998)
Historically, constitutional challenges to
school choice focused on application of the
United States Constitution’s First Amend-
ment Establishment Clause (otherwise
known as the Federal Establishment
Clause) and state establishment clauses.
Although some state establishment clauses
remain a viable option for constitutional
challenge, federal jurisprudence to date has
dismissed the Federal Establishment
Clause as a viable basis for invalidating
carefully written school choice statutes.
(Green & Moran, 2010). The Indiana Con-
stitution’s Religious Clauses are more
detailed and stringent than the Federal
Establishment Clause and therefore require
a slightly different legal analysis. We will
address both federal and state establish-
ment clauses; explore less-publicized fed-
eral Constitutional provisions relevant to
school choice in Indiana; and, where appli-
cable, address the recent lawsuit filed by
the Indiana State Teacher’s Association
(ISTA) which challenges the constitution-
ality of the Choice Scholarship program.
Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution
The First Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, in part, that “Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof.” This clause, as
applied through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, prohibits any state government from
passing laws which have the purpose or
effect of advancing religion.1 The Federal
Establishment Clause is not, however, vio-
lated every time money in the possession of
the state ends up in the possession of a reli-
gious institution.2 Rather, challenged pro-
grams are evaluated under a three-part test
expounded by the U.S. Supreme Court over
the last 60 years. Under the U.S. Supreme
Court’s test, a statute complies with the
Federal Establishment Clause if (a) it has a
secular legislative purpose, (b) its primary
effect neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion, and (c) it does not create excessive
entanglement between government and
religion.3 If written and administered care-
fully, state voucher and education tax credit
programs generally satisfy all three prongs
of the U.S. Supreme Court’s test. 
State voucher and education tax credit pro-
grams are generally found to have the sec-
ular legislative purpose of advancing
education. The court in Mueller v. Allen,
for example, held that “An educated popu-
lace is essential to the political and eco-
nomic health of any community, and a
State’s effort to assist parents in meeting
the rising cost of educational expenses
plainly serves this secular purpose of
ensuring that the State’s citizenry is well-
educated.”4 Programs that are designed to
1. Agostini v. Felton, 522 U.S. 803 (1997).
2. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 
(Wisc.1998) (citing Zobrest v. Catalina 
Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993)).
3. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. at 819 (quoting 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 
(1971)).
4. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983).
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benefit a broad spectrum of groups by allo-
cating aid on the basis of neutral, secular
criteria that neither favor nor disfavor reli-
gion are especially likely to meet the “sec-
ular legislative purpose” prong of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause
test.5 Indiana’s school choice statutes meet
these criteria.
Indiana Code § 6-3-2-22 clearly designates
a secular legislative purpose and casts a
wide net by granting a tax deduction spe-
cifically for educational expenditures (up
to $1,000) to any individuals who home-
school their dependent children or send
their dependent children to any private
school. Indiana Code § 20-51-1-7 requires
SGOs to make scholarships available for
more than one participating school and cre-
ates various safeguards to encourage neu-
tral disbursement of the scholarship funds.
Likewise, Indiana Code § 20-51-4-1 illus-
trates the secular purpose of advancing
education by listing an unprecedented
number of documents that all participating
schools must make available in order to
maintain eligibility in the Choice Scholar-
ship program. Indiana Code § 20-51-4-
3(b),(c) promotes a neutral process of
scholarship administration by prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of race, color,
or nation origin; requiring the admissions
policy of each school to be fairly applied;
and requiring a random drawing from eligi-
ble names when there are not enough open
seats in a particular school to accommodate
the number of applicants.
State voucher and education tax credit pro-
grams do not have the primary effect of
advancing religion when they are designed
in a way which (a) neither favors nor disfa-
vors religion in defining the program’s
beneficiaries, and (b) the state funds reach
the religious institution through the clear
private choices of citizens.6 The Supreme
Court held in Locke v. Davey that “under
our Establishment Clause precedent, the
link between government funds and reli-
gious training is broken by the independent
and private choice of recipients [of the
scholarship].”7 The Court in Committee for
Public Education and Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist found that a New York statute vio-
lated the Establishment Clause because
financial assistance went exclusively to
parents of children enrolled in private
schools that promoted religion.8 Wisconsin
seemingly observed the error of New
York’s program and created a program
which directed educational vouchers to
low-income parents who were then free to
choose the best school for their child. After
choosing a school, the parent endorsed the
voucher to the school.9
State voucher and 
education tax credit 
programs do not have the 
primary effect of 
advancing religion when 
they are designed in a way 
which (a) neither favors 
nor disfavors religion in 
defining the program’s 
beneficiaries, and (b) the 
state funds reach the 
religious institution 
through the clear private 
choices of citizens. 
Thus, the Wisconsin process could not be
deemed to “advance religion” because it
removed direct government involvement
from (a) the choosing of a religious school,
and (b) the funding of a religious school.
Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court
approved government funding for a deaf
child’s interpreter in a religious school even
though the government employee would
essentially be a “mouthpiece” for religious
instruction because the choice to be in
attendance at a private school was a deci-
sion wholly made by the parents, and, as
such, the Court held there was no primary
effect of the state advancing religion.10
Likewise, in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visi-
tors of the Univ. of Va., the court held that a
university was required to fund a Christian
campus newspaper in the same way in
which it funded other student groups The
Court held that “as long as the benefit was
neutral with respect to religion, what the
student did with that benefit, even if it was
to spend all of it on religion-related expen-
ditures, was irrelevant for purposes of ana-
lyzing whether the law or policy violated
the Establishment Clause.”11 It could be
argued that Indiana’s school expenditure
deduction and school tax credit do not vio-
late this prong of the Federal Establishment
Clause test because money is never given
directly from the state treasury to religious
institutions. The tax deduction and tax
credit are purely a result of the private
choices of parents and the private choices of
other unrelated individuals and corporations
who choose to donate money to SGOs.12
Indiana’s Choice Scholarships are at higher
risk for violating the “advancing religion”
prong because the source of the funds is, in
fact, the state treasury. However, Indiana’s
process for the delivery of state funds to
Choice Scholarship recipients mirrors
Cleveland’s process for vouchers, which
has already survived a Constitutional chal-
lenge.13 Before any funds are disbursed to
a Choice Scholarship recipient, parents
make a private choice as to which school
the student should attend. After making the
private choice, parents must co-endorse the
voucher with the chosen school. Thus, it
can be argued the state is merely advancing
private parental choice and education rather
than religion (IND CODE § 20-51-4-10).
State voucher and education tax credit pro-
grams do not lead to excessive entangle-
ment between the state and participating
sectarian schools when the program allows
private schools to operate without exces-
sive interference from the state govern-
ment. The court has held that when the
public school superintendent is called upon
to monitor performance, reporting, audit-
ing, nondiscrimination policies, and health
and safety requirements in the sectarian
schools receiving state funds, no excessive
5. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981).
6. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231; Lemon, 403 U.S. 
at 612; Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396.
7. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004); 
see Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 
639, 652 (2002); Zobrest v. Catalina Foot-
hills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1993); 
Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for 
Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986); Mueller v. 
Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399-400 (1983). 
8. Committee for Public Education and Reli-
gious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 
(1973).
9. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.E.2d 602 (Wisc.
1998).
10.Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist.
11.Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. 
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842-43 (1995).
12.See Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (AZ 
1999).
13.See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.
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entanglement occurs.14 Routine regulatory
interaction which does not involve inqui-
ries into religious doctrine or delegation of
state power to a religious body does not
create excessive entanglement.15
The provisions of Indiana’s school choice
statutes which grant tax credits and tax
deductions plainly avoid excessive govern-
ment entanglement. Indiana Code § 20-51-
4-1 (governing Choice Scholarships)
intends the state to avoid entanglement
with private schools: “… the department or
any other state agency may not in any way
regulate the educational program of a non-
public eligible school...” However, the
unprecedented list of requirements added
to Indiana Code § 20-51-4-1 puts the
Choice Scholarship at risk for excessive
entanglement. The IDOE will need to care-
fully create a mechanism for ensuring com-
pliance with the statute without entangling
and interfering with the private schools. If
the IDOE simply creates an annual survey
and inspection of a private school, it is
unlikely entanglement will be found. But if
the Department institutes checks which
require state employees to regularly enter
and monitor private schools, the Choice
Scholarship program could run afoul of the
Federal Establishment Clause.
In short, School Choice programs will
withstand scrutiny under the Establishment
Clause of the U.S. Constitution if they (a)
demonstrate a secular purpose such as pro-
motion of the education opportunities of
students, (b) are facially neutral, (c) do not
create a preference for or against religion,
(d) grant the benefit to a large class of ben-
eficiaries without regard to religion, (e)
grant the aid directly to the parents who
must then independently choose where to
direct the money, and (f) avoid government
entanglement.
Federal Free Exercise Clause
The Federal Establishment Clause prohib-
its the government from promoting or
excessively involving itself in religion,
while the Free Exercise Clause prohibits
the government from hindering an individ-
ual’s practice of religion, asserting that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof” (U.S. Const.
Amend. I). Sometimes a state action is per-
mitted by the Establishment Clause, but
not required by the Free Exercise Clause.16
In applying the Free Exercise Clause in
1972, the U.S. Supreme Court found a
compulsory education law which required
Amish parents to send their children to
school past eighth grade to be in conflict
with the Free Exercise Clause because
attending school after eighth grade was
against Amish religious beliefs.17 The
Court reasoned that “only those interests of
the highest order and those not otherwise
served can overbalance legitimate claims
to the free exercise of religion. However
strong the state’s interest in compulsory
education, it is by no means absolute to the
exclusion or subordination of all other
interests.”18
It has been argued that parents who, due to
lack of funds, are forced to send their chil-
dren to public schools, are being hindered in
their ability to practice religion as they see
fit.19 In response, courts have moved away
from the holding in Wisconsin v. Yoder and
have granted latitude to states by holding
that “valid and neutral laws of general
applicability” do not need to be justified by
a compelling governmental interest even if
the law has the “incidental effect of burden-
ing a particular religious practice.”20 Indi-
ana’s school choice statutes are not in
danger of violating the Federal Free Exer-
cise Clause because the funding provided
by the school choice statutes encourage the
free choice of parents to enroll students in
any private school, sectarian or secular. 
Other Federal Constitutional 
Law Provisions
In addition to the enumerated rights
granted by the United States Constitution,
the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the
Constitution to also protect certain unwrit-
ten (or “extra-textual”) rights as fundamen-
tal rights. Meyer v. Nebraska synthesized
some of the ways the courts have
expounded on the meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
Without doubt, [the Fourteenth
Amendment] denotes not merely free-
dom from bodily restraint but also the
right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupa-
tions of life, to acquire useful knowl-
edge, to marry, establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men. The
established doctrine is that this liberty
may not be interfered with, under the
guise of protecting the public interest,
by legislative action which is arbitrary
or without reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the
State to effect.
262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923)
One aspect of the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is “a right of personal privacy,
or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of
privacy.”21 The right of personal privacy
includes “the interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important deci-
sions.”22 Among the decisions an individ-
ual may make without unjustified
government interference are personal deci-
sions “relating to marriage,”23 “procre-
ation,”24 “contraception,”25 and “child
rearing and education.”26 
14.See Jackson v. Benson.
15.Id.
16.Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 
U.S. 664, 669 (1969).
17.Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
18.Id.
19.Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004); Nor-
wood v.Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); Eulitt 
v. Me. Dep't of Educ., 386 F.3d 344 (1st Cir. 
2004). 
20.Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hia-
leah, 508 U.S. 520, 531(1993) (holding 
unconstitutional a neutral law which, in real-
ity, only negatively impacted the practice of 
Santeria religion). 
21.Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). 
22.Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 
(1977).
23.Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
24.Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
25.Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-454 
(1972).
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Through the imposition of compulsory
education laws, some argue parents are pre-
vented from exercising their fundamental
right to rear and educate their children by
being forced to expose their children to the
many influences of the local public school
(Nasstrom, 1996; Smith, 1999). This argu-
ment struggles against precedent which
seemingly limits parental rights. “Acting to
guard the general interests in youth’s well-
being, the state as parens patriae may
restrict the parent’s control by requiring
school attendance…and the state has a
wide range of power for limiting parental
freedom and authority in things affecting
the child’s welfare.”27 Indeed, many state
constitutions28 revere education of the pop-
ulace to such a degree that parental rights
are eclipsed by compulsory education laws.
At the time of the creation of compulsory
education laws, requiring children to attend
schools in the face of remaining illiterate
was likely the greater societal good when
balanced against the power of parental
rights. But as has been the case with many
evolutions in our country and subsequent
jurisprudence, as society changes, so too
does the balance of the scales. 
In contemporary society, however, the bal-
ance between the state’s interest in an edu-
cated populace and a parent’s fundamental
right to choose the best upbringing for her
child is a much different analysis than that
completed by the scriveners of the compul-
sory education statutes. In modern society,
few schools serve a small, uniform com-
munity. Despite the best efforts of school
administrators and teachers, today’s
schools can expose children to aspects of
society which, in some cases, directly con-
tradict their parent’s values. In some
schools, it is not uncommon for a child to
witness violence, gain unauthorized Inter-
net access, observe drug use, and hear
graphic details of peers’ sexual encounters
in the process of a mandatory school day.
Public school teachers themselves are no
longer required to adhere to the strict moral
codes required of teachers when compul-
sory education laws were imposed.
Although the codes of teacher conduct in
place in 1915 were extreme,29 they none-
theless evidenced the desire of those who
wrote them to shelter children from nega-
tive influences during the course of the
school day. In many respects, some schools
are no longer able to accomplish this moral
neutrality. Compulsory education laws
often force parents to broach sensitive top-
ics earlier than they might choose. 
Of course most public schools are not “inju-
rious” to a child, but compulsory education
laws do not need to be “injurious” to a child
to place a burden on parents’ fundamental
right to parent their child as they desire.
Since the creation of compulsory education
laws, parenting styles and lifestyles have
dramatically changed and some parenting
choices simply cannot be accommodated
by the public school system. Single-parent
homes are especially more common in
today’s society, and compulsory education
laws all but prohibit the child of a single
parent from seeing her parent during the
week if that single parent is employed in a
capacity which requires shift work. A sin-
gle parent who works in the evenings may
seek out a private school with afternoon or
evening hours so that she may have the
ability to exercise her fundamental right to
parent her child in the mornings and mean-
ingfully interact with her child each day.
Other parents in today’s culture prefer all
organic surroundings for their children. The
local public school may not be willing or
able to ensure all cleaning supplies, snacks,
and meals are organic, but a small private
school may choose to embrace such a par-
enting desire. Today’s parents may prefer
specialized education for their children — a
classical education, an artistic focus, or
multi-age classrooms. Likewise, some
modern parents are more global than par-
ents from 100 years ago and may prefer that
world language and multi-cultural instruc-
tion play a large role in their children’s rear-
ing. The scriveners of compulsory school
laws simply could not have begun to realize
the magnitude of diverse parenting styles
embraced in today’s society.
Opponents of school choice respond to
such arguments by suggesting that a par-
ent’s fundamental right to raise her child is,
in fact, protected; after all, a parent may
“choose” to send her child to any school of
her desire and may even choose to home-
school her children. This “choice” is a fic-
tion for single parents and lower- to
middle-class families who do not have the
funds to pay for private tuition or the ability
to stay home and teach their children
(Smith, 1999). This “choice” is reminiscent
of the fictional voting rights given to the
poor and minorities in many states prior to
the enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of
1965.30 Although a parent’s right to choose
the manner of upbringing of her child is a
federally protected right, compulsory edu-
cation laws, although seemingly benign,
currently have the effect of inhibiting those
of lesser means from exercising that right
in much the same way that many states
inhibited the rights of those of lesser means
from exercising their fundamental right to
26.Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 
535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390, 399 (1923); Roe v. Wade, supra, at 152-
153. See also Cleveland Board of Education 
v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-640 (1974). 
27.Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 
(1944) (holding constitutional a state statute 
which prohibited children from selling liter-
ature on the streets despite parental permis-
sion).
28.“Knowledge and learning … being essential 
to the preservation of a free government …” 
Ind. Const. Art. 8. § I
29.Rules of Conduct for Teachers in 1915: 1) 
You will not marry during the term of your 
contract; 2) You are not to keep company 
with men; 3) You must be home between the 
hours of 8 p.m. and 6 a.m. unless attending a 
school function; 4) You may not loiter down-
town in ice cream stores; 5) You may not 
travel beyond the city limits unless you have 
the permission of the chairman of the board; 
6) You may not ride in a carriage or automo-
bile with any man unless he is your father or 
brother; 7) You may not smoke cigarettes; 8) 
You many not dress in bright colors; 9) You 
may under no circumstances dye your hair; 
10) You must wear at least two petticoats; 
11) You dresses must not be any shorter than 
two inches above the ankle. http://lang-
witches.org/blog/2009/04/05/teacher-code-
of-conduct-1915/
30.In 1870, the 15th Amendment gave all 
United States citizens the right to vote. It was 
not until almost 100 years later, with the pas-
sage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, that 
attention was finally paid to the burdens 
being placed on some citizens to exercise 
their fundamental right to vote. Even as late 
as 1959, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed the 
use of literacy tests, which had the effect of 
disproportionately hindering the ability of 
the poor and minorities to exercise their fun-
damental right to vote. Finding that “the abil-
ity to read and write has some relation to 
standards designed to promote intelligent use 
of the ballot.” Lassiter v. Northampton 
County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. at 53. 
Seven years later, the U.S. Supreme Court 
finally recognized the effect of the literacy 
tests on individuals’ fundamental right to 
vote in its application of the Voting Rights 
Act. “When a state exercises power wholly 
within the domain of state interest, it is insu-
lated from federal judicial review. But such 
insulation is not carried over when state 
power is used as an instrument for circum-
venting a federally protected right.” S.C. v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966).
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vote. Many, such as U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Clarence Thomas in Zelman v. Sim-
mons-Harris, suggest that in the post-
Brown v. Board of Education era, school
choice is the only means of emancipation
for low-income students trapped in failing
schools (Holme & Richards, 2009; Holme
& Wells, 2008; Ryan & Heise, 2002).
...[many states] have 
constitutional provisions 
which are more rigid and 
specific in their aversion 
to state funding for 
private education than 
Indiana, and therefore 
caution should be used 
when directly comparing 
the school choice 
provisions and case law 
from [other] states.
Opponents of school choice correctly point
out, however, that although states are pro-
hibited from infringing on a fundamental
right, they are not required to fund funda-
mental rights.31 Although it is true that the
state is not required to fund a parent’s fun-
damental right to choose how best to raise
her child, by imposing a significant, direct,
and disproportionate burden on lower
income individuals, compulsory education
laws transcend the holding in Maher v.
Roe. Maher affirms a state’s right to incen-
tivize one behavior (i.e., attendance at pub-
lic school through payment, healthcare for
birthing a fetus rather than aborting it), but
it fails to address the fact that compulsory
attendance laws directly burden a parent’s
fundamental right to raise a child. Parents
must educate their children — there is no
choice. Parents are required to allow the
state to impact the development of their
children and required to accept a burden on
their fundamental right to raise their chil-
dren. Citizens who do not have means to
pay for a school that matches their parent-
ing decisions are forced to send their chil-
dren into a school setting paid for by the
state, in which the curriculum contradicts
the parent’s beliefs and parenting style. In
fact, Maher cites the reasoning in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s concept of liberty “excludes
any general power of the State to standard-
ize its children by forcing them to accept
instruction from public teachers only …
which unreasonably interfered with the lib-
erty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under
their control” (268 U.S., at 534-535). Pro-
ponents of Indiana’s school choice statutes
would do well to defend the new provi-
sions under this aspect of the Federal Con-
stitution. 
We have outlined how Indiana’s school
choice statutes may be treated under the
Federal Constitution. We now move to pro-
visions of the Indiana Constitution which
may apply to Indiana’s school choice stat-
utes.
Indiana’s Religious Clauses
Indiana Constitution Article I provides: 
Section 2: All people shall be secured
in the natural right to worship
ALMIGHTY GOD, according to the
dictates of their own consciences. 
Section 4: No preference shall be
given, by law to any creed, religious
society, or mode of worship; and no
person shall be compelled to attend,
erect, or support any place of worship,
or to maintain any ministry, against his
consent. 
Section 6: No money shall be drawn
from the treasury, for the benefit of any
religious or theological institution. 
Although much media attention has
focused on the possibility that Indiana’s
school choice statutes violate Article I of
Indiana’s Constitution, it appears unlikely
that the statutes will be struck down based
on Article I of the Indiana Constitution. A
comparison of 25 state constitutions (see
Table 3) with a specific focus on Wiscon-
sin’s and Indiana’s Constitutions, legisla-
tive history, analysis of the word
“seminary,” and the fact that public dollars
are already spent on sectarian organiza-
tions, all lend support to the constitutional
validity of Indiana’s school choice statutes. 
Of the 26 states represented in Table 3
below, 1332 have constitutional provisions
that are much more rigid and specific in
their aversion to state funding for private
education than Indiana, and therefore cau-
tion should be used when directly compar-
ing the school choice provisions and case
law from these 13 states with Indiana’s
school choice statutes and pending litiga-
tion. For example, two states repeatedly
referred to by the ISTA suit were Virginia
(Almond v. Day) and New Hampshire
(Opinion of the Justices), but Virginia’s
Constitution can be readily distinguished
from Indiana’s: “No appropriation of pub-
lic funds shall be made to any school or
institution of learning not owned or exclu-
sively controlled by the State …” Likewise,
New Hampshire's Constitution provides,
“… no person shall ever be compelled to
pay towards the support of the schools of
any sect or denomination.” It is also notable
that, despite the more rigid and specific
constitutional prohibitions on private
school funding in these 13 states, 6 have
some form of tax credit, deduction, or nar-
row voucher available for private schools.
Of the 12 states represented in Table 3 that
have constitutional provisions that are, like
Indiana’s, somewhat nebulous with respect
to private school funding, 8 have some
form of tax credit or tax deduction avail-
able, and 8 have some form of voucher pro-
gram available. Wisconsin, although not
mentioned by the ISTA suit, has constitu-
tional provisions similar to Indiana’s. Spe-
cifically, Article I, Section 18 of
Wisconsin’s Constitution closely mirrors
Indiana’s Article I, Section 6: “… nor shall
any money be drawn from the treasury for
the benefit of religious societies, or reli-
gious or theological seminaries.” At first
glance, some might suggest the difference
between Indiana’s use of the word “institu-
tion” as compared to Wisconsin’s use of the
word “seminary” muddles comparison of
these two constitutional clauses. However,
the comparison is quite compelling when
consideration is given to how the word
“seminary” was used in the 1800s. The
Oxford Dictionary defines a seminary as:
31.Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475-77 (1977) 
(explaining that the fundamental right to 
abortion does not entail a companion right to 
a state-financed abortion).
32.Arizona, Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New 
Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Utah, 
and Virginia.
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“a place of education, a school, college,
university, or the like; often explicitly (cf.
3a)33 seminary of learning, seminary of sci-
ence, etc. Also in more specific sense (cf.
3b)34 an institution for the training of those
destined for some particular profession.”
Interpreted into modern language, Indi-
ana’s constitution simply states that funds
cannot be granted for the benefit of reli-
gious institutions, while Wisconsin’s con-
stitution goes a step further and states that
funds cannot be granted for the benefit of
religious schools. Despite this hurdle, Wis-
consin’s school choice program was found
to be in compliance with its constitution. In
Jackson v. Benson, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court determined that money was drawn
from the Wisconsin treasury for the “bene-
fit” of education — not for the “benefit” of
religion. As such, the Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program did not violate the Wiscon-
sin Constitution.35 Because Indiana Consti-
tution Article I, Section 6 is so similar to
Wisconsin Constitution Article I, Section
18 and arguably sets a lower standard than
Wisconsin’s Article 18, it appears unlikely
the Indiana school choice statutes will be
found unconstitutional based on Indiana
Constitution Article I, Section 6. 
Wisconsin also has a “compelled support
clause” similar to Indiana’s Article I, Sec-
tion 4. The Wisconsin Supreme Court also
interpreted Wisconsin’s “compelled sup-
port clause” in Jackson and indicated that
as long as people were not being forced to
participate in religious activities at secular
schools or forced to attend the secular
schools, the “compelled support clause”
was not violated. Including Wisconsin and
Indiana, there are at least eight states with
“compelled support clauses” coupled with
a history of school choice litigation or leg-
islation. Table 3 below summarizes the leg-
islation, case law, and applicable
constitutional provisions of school choice
states. Of the eight states listed below with
“compelled support clauses,” only two
have language which is comparable to
Indiana and also agree with ISTA’s36 asser-
tion that individuals are “compelled” to
support religion simply by paying taxes
which eventually end up in the possession
of a secular school. The logic behind the
ISTA position battles against the logic of
Everson v. Board of Education: “… a
policeman protects a Catholic … not
because he is a Catholic, but because
he…is a member of our society. The fire-
man protects the Church school — but not
because it is a Church school; it is because
it is property, part of the assets of our soci-
ety.”37 An individual, through the simple
act of paying taxes (which are then filtered
through the private choices of other indi-
viduals) is not being “compelled” to sup-
port a religious institution for the purposes
of Indiana’s Article I, Section 4 — the indi-
vidual is merely being “compelled” to sup-
port education as chosen by the child’s
parent. It is significant that the state of
Indiana has been directly funding sectarian
organizations for many years in the form of
private secular universities, group homes
for troubled youth, and family services
providers (see Department of Child Ser-
vices Provider directory located at http://
www.in.gov/dcs/2608.htm). The support
given to sectarian schools through the
school choice statutes is actually less
offensive to Article I, Section 4 than, for
example, foster care per diems, which
arrive at sectarian foster agencies38 purely
through state-actors’ decisions. Unless
opponents of school choice in Indiana also
wish to dismantle private secular foster
care funding, private secular health provid-
ers funding, and state subsidies for private
secular universities, Article I, Section 4 of
the Indiana Constitution does not provide a
strong basis for opposition. 
Equal Education Clause of 
Indiana’s Constitution
In addition to Indiana, the constitutions of
at least 13 other states39 require a uniform
system of public schools (Green & Moran,
2010). Opponents of school choice tend to
cite a recent Florida Supreme Court deci-
sion, Bush v. Holmes, where a statewide
voucher system was found unconstitutional
due to the Florida Constitution’s Equal
Education Clause. Aside from being a
much-debated decision in its own right, the
Bush decision is not applicable to Indiana’s
constitutional analysis of the school choice
statutes. Florida’s Constitution, although
similar, utilizes much stronger language
upon which the Bush court chose to base its
decision: “…a paramount duty of the state
[is] to make adequate provision for the edu-
cation of all children residing within its bor-
ders…[the state is required to provide] a
uniform, efficient, safe, secure and high
quality system of free public schools.”
(FLA. CONST. art. IX §I(a)). The Bush
court asserted that the word “paramount”
indicated that the duty to create a uniform
school system was not something that could
be delegated in any way to any entity.40
Critics of the Bush decision (including the
dissenting justice) argue that the Florida
Supreme Court majority overextended the
language of the Florida Constitution in its
decision, believing instead that the Florida
voucher program was constitutional
because it did not prevent the legislature
from creating the voucher system as a sup-
plement to an already adequately function-
ing public school system.41 
33.“...a place of origin and early development; a 
place or thing in which something (e.g., an 
art or science, a virtue or vice) is developed 
or cultivated, or from which it is propagated 
abundantly.”
34.“a place, country, society, condition of 
things, or the like, in which some particular 
class of persons are produced or trained.”
35.Jackson, 578 N.E.2d at 621. 
36.The ISTA lawsuit references Indiana’s 
Embry v. O'Bannon, as well as cases from 
Vermont, Virginia, New Hampshire, and 
Iowa in support of its “compelled support” 
argument. See Table 3 below for a compari-
son between Indiana’s Constitution and the 
constitutions of the states referred to by 
ISTA.
37.Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S.1, 
25 (1947). 
38.For example, White’s Residential & Family 
Services is a residential treatment facility 
and foster care provider for the state of Indi-
ana that directly receives state funds and 
openly professes on its website to be a 
“Christ-centered organization committed to 
enriching the lives of children and fami-
lies…[and has a]…primary core value…to 
model God’s grace and love…” Children 
sent to White’s Residential & Family Ser-
vices against their will by the state of Indiana 
are required to attend religious services dur-
ing their stay regardless of personal beliefs. 
See www.whiteskids.org. 
39.Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Minnesota, 
Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Wash-
ington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
40.Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla 2006).
41.120 Harv. L. Rev. 1097, 1100 (February, 
2007).
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Indiana Constitution Article 8 provides:
Section 1: Knowledge and learning
generally diffused throughout the com-
munity, being essential to the preserva-
tion of a free government; it shall be the
duty of the General Assembly to
encourage, by all suitable means,
moral, intellectual, scientific, and agri-
cultural improvement; and to provide,
by law, for a general and uniform sys-
tem of Common Schools, wherein
tuition shall be without charge, and
equally open to all.
The Indiana General Assembly’s mandate is
to: (a) encourage by all suitable means
moral, intellectual, scientific, and agricul-
tural improvement, and (b) to provide, by
law, for a general and uniform system of
Common Schools. The ISTA lawsuit sug-
gests that Common Schools are the only
way the General Assembly may achieve the
education of Indiana’s youth. This interpre-
tation disregards the first part of the clause
which gives the General Assembly the abil-
ity to achieve the education of Indiana stu-
dents through “all suitable means.” (In fact,
the authors of the ISTA Complaint delete
the phrase “by all suitable means” when
they quote Article 8, Section I of the Indiana
Constitution in their Complaint and in their
Brief.) Nothing in Article 8, Section 1 pre-
vents the Indiana legislature from providing
a general and uniform system of schools and
providing other methods (such as school
choice) for the education of Indiana’s chil-
dren. Indiana’s school choice statutes will
not likely violate this provision of Indiana’s
constitution unless the Indiana Supreme
Court determines school choice to be an
“unsuitable means” to encourage the moral,
intellectual, scientific, and agricultural
improvement of Indiana’s citizens. 
LOOKING FORWARD…WHAT 
CAN INDIANA LEARN FROM 
OTHERS?
Indiana now joins the District of Columbia,
Colorado (Douglas County), Maine, Loui-
siana, Wisconsin (Milwaukee), and Ohio
(Cleveland) as having school choice pro-
grams which grant state-funded vouchers to
individuals based on income or the failing
status of their neighborhood schools. Ver-
mont and Maine, largely rural states, only
grant state-funded vouchers to individuals
if there is not a public school in the imme-
diate area. But, in Maine, the funds may
only be used at secular schools. Arizona,
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Ohio, Okla-
homa, and Utah provide state-funded
vouchers to students with disabilities. Flor-
ida’s original voucher program, which was
overturned in Bush v. Holmes, supra,
served a broader base of students. Colorado
also initially passed a more comprehensive
school voucher program which was over-
turned in Owens v. Colorado Congress of
Parents in 2004. The Colorado litigation
centered on a clause in the Colorado consti-
tution which vests all “control of instruc-
tion in the public schools districts” in the
individually elected board members of the
districts. The Supreme Court of Colorado
held that a statewide mandatory voucher
program infringed on the “control” of the
local districts. In response to this decision,
the local Douglas County school district
recently voted to create a voucher program
within its own district. 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, was one of the first
cities to implement a voucher program —
the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program
(MPCP) — which provides eligible stu-
dents the chance to attend any school of
their choice. State funds in the form of a
voucher are given to an eligible student’s
parents. The voucher is then endorsed at
the school of the parents’ choosing. After
being heavily litigated and upheld in Wis-
consin courts, the U.S. Supreme Court
declined to grant certiorari on the case.
Like Milwaukee, Cleveland implemented a
School Voucher Program (SVP) to grant
financial assistance to children from low-
income families. Unlike MPCP, when a
parent chooses to send a student to a public
school outside the district, the state sends
those choice funds directly to the school
without issuing a voucher per se, but when
a parent chooses to send a student to a sec-
tarian school, the state sends the funds to
the parents in the form of a voucher to be
endorsed over to the school of the parents’
choosing. The Ohio program was also
heavily litigated in state courts, but, in the
end, the program was held constitutional
by the Ohio Supreme Court. 
Arizona, the District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Rhode
Island have all implemented tax credit pro-
grams. The Arizona tax credit statute was
also heavily litigated at the state level. The
United States Supreme Court did grant cer-
tiorari on the case, but the issue argued at
the United States Supreme Court turned on
whether or not taxpayers had “standing” to
bring a challenge against the statute rather
than focusing on the question of whether
the statute itself was constitutional. See
Table 3 below for a further breakdown of
school choice programs throughout the
country, their statutes, case law, and rele-
vant constitutional provisions. 
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TABLE 3. Compilation of School Choice Nationwide
Location; Type; Eligibility Applicable Constitutional Provision Cases
Alaska - No school choice program, but cited by 
ISTA suit
Art. VII, § 1:...No money shall be paid from public 
funds for the direct benefits of a religious or other 
private educational institution.
Sheldon Jackson College v. State, 1979 - 
(Alaska Supreme Court held that tuition program 
for private college students was invalid due to Art. 
VII, §1)
Arizona (2006) - Public Voucher (now unconsti-
tutional); Foster kids and kids with disabilities
Art. II, § 12: …No public money or property shall 
be appropriated for or applied to any religious 
worship, exercise, or instruction, or to the support 
of any religious establishment….
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-891
Cain v. Horne, 2009 - (Arizona Supreme Court 
holding that the program was unconstitutional 
under the Aid Clause w/o discussing Religion 
Clause)
Arizona (1997) - Private Tax Credit - 100% of 
donation, $500 max. for individuals, $1,000 max. 
for couples, no max. for corporations, $17.28 mil-
lion cap; Low-income students, foster kids, kids 
with disabilities
(2006) - Corporate Private Tax Credit
Art. II, § 12, supra. and
Art. IX, § 10: No tax shall be laid or appropriation 
of public money made in aid of any church, or pri-
vate or sectarian school, or any public service 
corporation.
A.R.S. 43-1184 (individuals); A.R.S. 43-1183 
(corporations); Kotterman v. Killian, 1999 (Ari-
zona Supreme Court upheld tax credit under Fed-
eral Establishment Clause & Arizona Aid Clause 
& Arizona Gift Clause); Hibbs v. Winn, 2004 
(U.S. Supreme Court holding Arizona tax credit 
program does not violate Federal Establishment 
Clause); Arizona Christian School Tuition Org. 
v. Winn, 2011 (U.S. Supreme Court holding that 
taxpayers lack standing to challenge tax credit 
program)
Colorado (2011) - Public Voucher; Douglas 
County only
Art. IX, § 7:…no school district….shall ever make 
any appropriation, or pay from any public fund or 
moneys whatever, anything in aid of any church 
or sectarian society, or for any sectarian purpose, 
or to help support or sustain any school, acad-
emy, seminary, college, university or other literary 
or scientific institution, controlled by any church 
or sectarian denomination whatsoever; nor shall 
any grant or donation of land, money or other 
personal property, ever be made by the state, or 
any such public corporation to any church, or for 
any sectarian purpose.
Colorado (2003) - Public Voucher (now unconsti-
tutional); Low-Income students in underperform-
ing schools
Art. IX, § 15: The general assembly shall, by law, 
provide for organization of school districts of con-
venient size, in each of which shall be estab-
lished a board of education, to consist of three or 
more directors to be elected by the qualified elec-
tors of the district. Said directors shall have con-
trol of instruction in the public schools of their 
respective districts. 
Owens v. Colorado Congress of Parents - 
2004 (Colorado Supreme Court held program 
unconstitutional because it took control away 
from the local school districts) 
Florida (1999) - Public Voucher (now unconstitu-
tional); students in underperforming schools
Art. IX, § 1: The education of children is a funda-
mental value of the people of the State of Florida. 
It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to 
make adequate provision for the education of all 
children residing within its borders. Adequate pro-
vision shall be made by law for a uniform, effi-
cient, safe, secure, and high quality system of 
free public schools that allows students to obtain 
a high quality education...
Bush v. Holmes - 2006 (Florida Supreme Court 
held unconstitutional because of Paramount Duty 
of Equal Education Clause)
Florida (2001) - Corporate Private Tax Credit - 
100% of donation, $140 million cap; Low-income 
students with priority given to students who 
received voucher prior to Bush v. Holmes deci-
sion
F.S. 220.187
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Florida (2001) - Public Voucher; Kids with dis-
abilities; Amount based on individual child's 
needs, but average amount per child is $7,144.00
Art. I, § 3: …No revenue of the state or any polit-
ical subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be 
taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly 
in aid of any church, sect, or religious denomina-
tion or in aid of any sectarian institution.
Fla. Stat. § 1002.39
Georgia (2007) - Public Voucher; Kids with dis-
abilities; Amount based on individual child's 
needs, but average amount is $6,000.00.
Art. I, § II, Par. VII: No money shall ever be taken 
from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in 
aid of any church, sect, cult, or religious denomi-
nation or of any sectarian institution.
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-2118
Georgia (2008) - Private Tax Credit - 100% of 
donation, 75% of total tax liability limit for corpo-
rations, $1,000 limit for individuals, $2,500 limit 
for couples, $50 million cap; Open to all students
Art.I, Sec.II, Par. VII: No money shall ever be 
taken from the public treasury, directly or indi-
rectly, in aid of any church, sect, cult, or religious 
denomination or of any sectarian institution.
O.C.G.A. § 48-7-29.16
Idaho - No school choice program, but cited by 
ISTA suit
Art. IX, § 5:…neither legislature nor any county, 
city, town, township, or school district….shall ever 
make any appropriation…anything in aid of 
any…school, academy, seminary, college, or uni-
versity…controlled by any church, sectarian or 
religious denomination whatsoever…
Doolittle v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 
1996 (Idaho Supreme Court held payment for 
handicapped child’s tuition at sectarian school 
against Art. IX, § 5).
Illinois - no school choice program, but cited by 
ISTA suit
Art. X, § 3: Neither the General Assembly nor 
any county, city, town, township, school district, or 
other public corporation, shall ever make any 
appropriation or pay from any public fund whatso-
ever…to help support or sustain any school, 
academy….controlled by any church or sectarian 
denomination whatever…
Trust v. Ketteler Manual Training School, 1918 
(Illinois Supreme Court held state could use pub-
lic funds to pay for child care services at religious 
institutions b/c children not required to attend reli-
gious services and schools received no reim-
bursement for expenses associated with religious 
instruction).
People ex. rel. Klinger v. Hewlett, 1973 (Illinois 
Supreme Court held tuition grants for private ele-
mentary schools with no restrictions on the use of 
public funds to be unconstitutional)
Board of Education v. Bakalis, 1973 (Illinois 
Supreme Court held use of public school buses 
for private school students constitutional)
Van Zandt v. Thompson, 1988 (7th Cir. held cre-
ation of a non-denominational chapel in state 
house constitutional)
Toney v. Bower, 2001 (Illinois Appellate Court 
held statute granting tax credit for private school 
expenses constitutional) 
Indiana (2011) - Education Expenditure Tax 
Deduction - $1,000 per child per year deduction 
allowed for unreimbursed education expenses at 
public, private, or home school
Ind. Code § 6-3-2-22
Indiana (2011) - Public Voucher; families below 
the federal poverty level receive scholarship for 
90% of their portion of the funding formula; fami-
lies between 100% and 150% of federal poverty 
level receive scholarship for 50% of their portion 
of the funding formula; $4,500 annual max. for 
each student
Art. I, § VI: No money shall be drawn from the 
treasury, for the benefit of any religious or theo-
logical institution.
Art. VIII, § I:…Knowledge and learning, generally 
diffused throughout a community, being essential 
to the preservation of a free government; it shall 
be the duty of the General Assembly to encour-
age, by all suitable means, moral, intellec-
tual…and to provide by law, for a general and 
uniform system of Common Schools, wherein 
tuition shall be without charge, and equally open 
to all.
Art. I § IV: …no person shall be compelled to 
attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or 
to maintain any ministry, against his consent. 
Ind. Code § 20-51-1-4
Embry v. O’Bannon, 2002 (Indiana Supreme 
Court interpreted Art. I, § VI and held program 
which gave state funds to pay for teacher salaries 
and computers in parochial schools constitu-
tional)
Nagy v. Evansville, 2006 (Indiana Supreme 
Court interpreted Art. VII, § I and held program of 
assessing a fee to students in public school 
unconstitutional.)
Indiana (2009) - Private Tax Credit for Corpora-
tions and Individuals; 50% of donation with $5 
million cap
Ind. Code § 6-3.1-30.5-3; 
Ind. Code § 20-51-1-7; 
Ind. Code 20-51-3-5
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Iowa (2006) - Private Tax Credit; 65% of dona-
tion; $7.5 million cap; family below 300% of fed-
eral poverty
Art. I, §3: …nor shall any person be compelled to 
attend any place of worship, pay tithes, taxes, or 
other rates for building or repairing places of wor-
ship, or the maintenance of any minister, or min-
istry
I.C. 422.11S
Knowlton v. Baumhover, 1918 - (Iowa Supreme 
Court held unconstitutional any taxation for eccle-
siastical support)
Louisiana (2008) Personal Tax Deduction for 
50% of unreimbursed educational expenses with 
$5,000 cap per child
LA. R.S. 47.297.10
Louisiana (2008) - Public Voucher; family below 
250% of federal poverty in underperforming 
school
Art. I, § 8: No law shall be enacted respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof 
LA. R.S. 17:43
Louisiana (2010) - Public Voucher - kids with dis-
abilities; voucher with a value of up to 50% of 
what state would spend on child in the public 
school
Art. VIII, § 1: The legislature shall provide for the 
education of the people of the state and shall 
establish and maintain a public educational sys-
tem.
LA. R.S. 17:4011
Maine (2005) - Public Voucher; if no public 
school exists in a rural area, the state will pay for 
a private secular school tuition
Art. I, § 3: …all religious societies in this State, 
whether incorporate or unincorporated, shall at all 
times have the exclusive right of electing their 
public teachers, and contracting with them for 
their support and maintenance.
20 A M.R.S. §§2951-2955
Eulitt v. State of Maine, 2004 - (U.S. Supreme 
Court case where parents failed in asserting Fed-
eral Equal Protection claim when they were not 
allowed to use voucher for Catholic school)
Massachusetts - no school choice but cited by 
ISTA suit
Art. XVII, § 2: …no grant, appropriation or use of 
public money…shall be made or authorized by 
the commonwealth…for the purpose of…main-
taining or aiding any...school…wherein any 
denominational doctrine is inculcated, or any 
other…school…which is not publicly owned and 
under the exclusive control, order, and superin-
tendence of public officer or public agents…
Commonwealth v. School Committee of 
Springfield, 1981 (Massachusetts Supreme 
Court held use of state funds to educate special 
needs students in private schools to be constitu-
tional)
Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 1987 
(Massachusetts Supreme Court opined that bill 
providing for a tax deduction for public and non-
public elementary and secondary school tuition, 
textbooks, and transportation expenses 
amounted to “use” of public money and violated 
XVII, § 2).
Minnesota (1997) - Education Tax Credits and 
Deduction; 75% of unreimbursed education 
expenses, $1,000 per child max per year; sliding 
scale based on income eligibility of family
Art. XII, §2: In no case shall any public money or 
property be appropriated or used for the support 
of schools wherein the distinctive doctrines, 
creeds or tenets of any particular Christian or 
other religious sect are promulgated or taught.
Minn. Stat. §290.0674; Minn. Stat. §290.01
Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer 
1978 - (Federal district court in Minnesota upheld 
refundable tax deduction); Mueller v. Allen, 1983 
(U.S. Supreme Court held Federal Establishment 
clause not violated by granting tax credit for 
tuition, textbooks and transportation at private 
and public schools equally)
Mississippi - no school choice program, but 
cited by ISTA suit
Art. VIII, § 208: …nor shall any funds be appro-
priated toward the support of any sectarian 
school…
Otken v. Lamkin, 1879 (Mississippi Supreme 
Court struck down statute which paid students 
attending private schools their pro rata share of 
state education funds).
Chance v. Mississippi State Textbook Rating 
1941 - (Mississippi Supreme Court upheld statute 
which allowed public school books to be used by 
secular schools).
New Hampshire - no voucher program, but cited 
by ISTA lawsuit
Pt.I, Art. VI: …no person shall ever be compelled 
to pay towards the support of the schools of any 
sect or denomination.
Opinion of the Justices, 1992 (New Hampshire 
Supreme Court held statute allowing “sending” 
public school to pay funds to religious school as 
against New Hampshire Constitution which is 
noticeably more narrow than Indiana Constitu-
tion).
New York - New York City - Mandatory Open 
Choice; all high school students must choose 
their top 12 high school choices out of 600 high 
school programs
TABLE 3. Compilation of School Choice Nationwide (continued)
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New York - Private Tax Credit Art. XI, § 3: Neither the state nor any subdivision 
thereof shall use its property or credit or any pub-
lic money or authorize or permit either to be used, 
directly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance, other 
than for examination or inspection, of any school 
or institution of learning wholly or in part under 
the control or direction of any religious denomina-
tion or in which any denominational tenet or doc-
trine is taught, but the legislature may provide for 
the transportation of children to and from any 
school or institution of learning. 
Committee for Public Education & Religious 
Liberty v. Nyquist, 1973 
(U.S. Supreme Court held unconstitutional New 
York law which provided tuition reimbursement 
for parents sending children to nonpublic schools 
under the Federal Establishment Clause; con-
versely held tax credits for nonpublic school 
expenses constitutional)
North Carolina (2011) - Private Tax Credit - 
$6,000 refundable credit given directly to families 
with kids with disabilities enrolled in private 
schools; $2,500 refundable credit to family under 
$100,000 annual income 
Art. I, § 13: All persons have a natural and 
inalienable right to worship Almighty God accord-
ing to the dictates of their own consciences, and 
no human authority shall, in any case whatever, 
control or interfere with the rights of conscience.
House Bill 344
Ohio Public Voucher - kids on the autism spec-
trum (2003); underperforming school (2005) 
Ohio Rev. Stat. § 3310.41 and Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 3310.02
Ohio (1995) - Public Voucher; Cleveland families 
below 200% of federal poverty
§ 1.07: All men have a natural and indefeasible 
right to worship Almighty God according to the 
dictates of their own conscience. No person shall 
be compelled to attend, erect, or support any 
place of worship, or maintain any form of wor-
ship…
Ohio Rev. Stat. § 3313.97.4 thru § 3313.99; 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 2002 (U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld Cleveland voucher pro-
gram in the face of Federal Establishment Clause 
challenge)
Oklahoma (2010) - Public Voucher; kids with dis-
abilities
Art. II, § II, Par. 5: No public money shall ever be 
appropriated, applied, donated, or used, directly 
or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any 
sect, church, denomination, or system of religion, 
or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, 
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or 
dignitary, or sectarian institution as such.
70 O.S.S. §13-101.1
Oklahoma (2011) - Private Tax Credit; 50% of 
donation w/$1,000 max for individuals, $2,000 
max for couples, $100,000 for corporations; $3.4 
million cap; families below 300% of federal pov-
erty
69 O.S.S. §2357.206
Pennsylvania (2001) - Corporate Private Tax 
Credit - 75% of donation for one-year contribu-
tion, 90% for two-year contribution, $300,000 
max per corporation, $44.7 million cap; Families 
of four w/income less than $60,000 with $12,000 
added for each additional household member
Art. I, Sec.III: …no preference shall ever be 
given by law to any religious establishments or 
modes of worship.
Art. III, Sec.15: No money raised for the support 
of the public schools of the Commonwealth shall 
be appropriated to or used for the support of any 
sectarian school.
24 P.S. §§20-2001-B-20-2008-B
Rhode Island (2006) - Corporate Private Tax 
Credit - 75% of donation for one-year contribu-
tion, 90% for two-year contribution, $100,000 
max per corporation, $1.0 million cap; Families 
below 250% of federal poverty
Art.I, Sec.III: …we therefore, declare that no per-
son shall be compelled to frequent or to support 
any religious worship, place, or ministry what-
ever, except in fulfillment of such person’s volun-
tary contract….
RIGL 44-62.1-44-62.7
Tennessee (pending) -- Public Voucher; low-
income students
Art. I, § 3: That all men have a natural and inde-
feasible right to worship Almighty God according 
to the dictates of their own conscience; that no 
man can of right be compelled to attend, erect, or 
support any place of worship, or to maintain any 
minister against his consent....
SB 485 - passed Senate 
Utah (2005) - Public Voucher; kids with disabili-
ties
Art. I, § 4: …No public money or property shall 
be appropriated for or applied to any religious 
worship, exercise or instruction, or for the support 
of any ecclesiastical establishment.
Utah Code Ann. § 53A-1a-701-710
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LOOKING FORWARD…HOW 
SHOULD INDIANA MEASURE 
SUCCESS? 
Much research has been conducted on the
effectiveness of school choice, but several
factors have made conclusive research dif-
ficult to accomplish. A 2007 survey by the
U.S. Department of Education of the
56,285 participants in school voucher pro-
grams determined that 30 percent of all
voucher users were students with disabili-
ties, as compared to mainstream public
schools which average 14 percent in atten-
dance with disabilities (Wolf, 2008). Stu-
dents utilizing the voucher system also
tend to have a history of underperforming
in their neighborhood public school (Wolf,
2008). The “period of adjustment” for a
new school choice student after switching
to a new school also causes consternation
for researchers. Any major change, such as
changing schools, can cause a student’s test
scores to drop before any gains can be mea-
sured (Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004;
Temple & Reynolds, 1999; Wolf, 2008).
Further, parents who are motivated to uti-
lize school choice programs may not be
representative of the “average” parent in a
mainstream public school. Wolf notes that
“In methodological terms, simple compar-
ison of private school students with public
school students, voucher applicants with
non-applicants, or voucher users with non-
users, all will be subject to varying degrees
of selection bias” (Wolf, 2008, p.423).
Because of the unique attributes of the stu-
dents utilizing school choice program-
ming, it is not a helpful measure to simply
compare students who use school choice
programs against students who do not use
school choice programs, and conducting
useful research on the efficacy of school
choice programs is difficult. 
Researchers have attempted three different
methods to minimize the impact of these
factors in the evaluation of school choice
programs: cross-sectional studies that sta-
tistically model selection, longitudinal
studies which utilize matching techniques,
and randomized experiments (Wolf, 2008).
Of the three, longitudinal random assign-
ment studies are the only ones to receive
the gold standard of reliability because
they eliminate the variable of parental bias
and involvement, as well as take before and
after snapshots of participants (Wolf,
2008). In fact, random assignment studies
have been found to be so powerful for eval-
uating choice programs that the U.S.
Department of Education’s What Works
Clearinghouse has labeled them the only
research design that meets its evidence
standards for rigor “without reservations”
(Betts & Hill, 2006; Wolf, 2008). “With
random assignment, you can know some-
thing with much greater certainty and, as a
result, can more confidently separate fact
from advocacy” (Gueron, 2000, p.429). 
In addition to determining if school choice
programs have a positive effect on student
achievement, Indiana may wish to deter-
mine why school choice programs may or
may not have a positive effect on student
achievement (Wolf & Hoople, 2006). In
general, both proponents and opponents of
school choice assert that the characteristics
of a student’s peer group have independent
and significant effects on the student’s aca-
demic achievement. Id. If one of the goals
of the implementation of school choice
programs is to improve education, simply
measuring outcomes is not enough — fur-
ther study into how peer groups and other
more-difficult-to-measure internal school
factors improve or harm student achieve-
ment is critical. 
Vermont (1869) - Public Voucher; if no public 
school exists in rural area, state will pay for pri-
vate secular school tuition 
Ch. I, Art. III: …no person ought to, or of right 
can be compelled to attend any religious worship, 
or erect or support any place of worship, or main-
tain any minister, contrary to the dictates of con-
science…
16 V.S.A. §166
Chittenden Town School Dist. v. Dept. of Ed. 
1999 (Vermont Supreme Court held tuition reim-
bursement to sectarian schools unconstitutional if 
given without restriction of religious instruction)
Virginia - no voucher program, but cited by ISTA 
lawsuit
Art. VIII, §10 (formerly § 141): No appropriation 
of public funds shall be made to any school or 
institution of learning not owned or exclusively 
controlled by the State or some political subdivi-
sion thereof…
Almond v. Day, 1955 (Virginia Supreme Court 
overturned voucher program not on the “com-
pelled support clause” of Art. I, §16 of Virginia 
Constitution as indicated by the ISTA lawsuit, but 
on Art. VII, §10 of the Virginia Constitution which 
is noticeably more specific than Indiana's “com-
pelled support” clause).
Glassman v. Arlington County, Virginia, 2010 
(U.S. Ct. App. 4th Dist. held that it was constitu-
tional for the state to give funds to a church so 
that the church could build affordable housing).
Washington, D.C. (2004) - Public Voucher - up 
to $8,000 for elementary and middle school, up to 
$12,000 for high school; 185% below federal pov-
erty with priority given to students in low-perform-
ing schools
D.C. Code §§38-1851.01-1851.11
Wisconsin (1990) - Milwaukee Public Voucher; 
families below 175% of federal poverty
Art. I, § 18: …nor shall any person be compelled 
to…support any place of worship, or to maintain 
any ministry…nor shall any money be drawn from 
the treasury for the benefit of religious societies, 
or religious or theological seminaries.
Wis. Stat. §119.23
Jackson v. Benson, 1998 (Wisconsin Supreme 
Court held Milwaukee voucher program constitu-
tional).
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Some also suggest that research on the
effects of school choice should transcend
analysis of student achievement and look to
levels of civic responsibility instilled in
students and the effects school choice may
have on the health of a community. By
choosing to be a part of a smaller school
community, some argue “choice parents”
accept more ownership and commitment to
the schools thereby increasing student
achievement but improving the neighbor-
hood immediately surrounding the school
as well (Brinig & Garnet, 2010). One study
found that attending a private school for
one year led to a considerable increase in
students’ political tolerance and political
knowledge (Campbell, 2008). Others argue
that school choice tends to geographically
distance students’ homes from their
schools, which decreases the feeling of
ownership and commitment to the commu-
nity immediately surrounding schools.
Research which tracks the impact of school
choice programs should also include mea-
sures to track parent involvement, stu-
dents’ civic knowledge and involvement,
and improvements or deterioration in the





It is important to consider how both parents
and children will be assisted in making the
decision to change schools. In the creation
of school choice programming, it is natural
to consider parents as the primary decision-
maker. However, what results if a child and
a parent disagree over school choice? Will
Indiana allow a child’s preference to trump
a parent’s? Will there be a review process
for students who disapprove of a parent’s
decision? And what results when a parent
is disengaged or unable to engage in the
school choice process? Will information be
available for students to disseminate so that
they may advocate for themselves? Will
educational surrogates be appointed for
students who wish to exercise their right to
school choice in the face of parents who are
disinterested? In order for school choice
programs to have the greatest potential for
granting equal access to school choice pro-
grams, students as well as parents need sys-
tematic help in making school choice
decisions. Special attention must be given
to transfer students, immigrant students,
children of immigrant parents, and chil-
dren of less-educated parents as the stu-
dents are more likely to be the sole choice
decision-makers about school choice
(Saporit & Lareua, 1999). 
Recommendations
To help school choice have the most posi-
tive impact on education, the IDOE should
provide tools and supports to parents and
children for navigating the often compli-
cated nuances of school choice and give
special attention to (a) a student’s role in
the school choice decision-making pro-
cess, and (b) how best to educate families
about their school choice options.
Conclusion
Even after navigating the tricky maze of
understanding school choice options and
submitting a request for a school, the con-
cerns facing families do not subside. Being
forced to enter a school which a student did
not choose can feel like failure (Devine,
1996). Students left without much parental
direction in New York’s school choice sys-
tem reported making mistakes and feeling
“stuck” in a “bad” school (Rosenbloom
2010). 
Recommendations
The process currently outlined in Indiana’s
school choice statutes partially helps to pre-
vent such a feeling of rejection by requiring
a public lottery drawing when a school is
faced with more applicants than seats avail-
able. Enforcement of the lottery system will
be important as school choice programming
moves forward in Indiana. Students must
also be informed that they can re-enroll in
their public school of legal settlement if the
Choice School they have selected does not
meet their educational needs.
Conclusion
In addition to basic information about
school choice options, accurate informa-
tion about the unique attributes of various
schools is difficult to acquire and synthe-
size. Families navigating New York’s
school choice offerings expressed frustra-
tion with school administrators’ publica-
tion of inflated or false program offerings
and statistics (Rosenbloom, 2010). “Clas-
sical economics tell us that a free market
guarantees the highest quality goods and
services for the lowest price only when the
consumer has ‘perfect information’ about
the available goods and services. In the free
educational market that ‘choice’ is
designed to create, how are students and
parents supposed to get this information?
And just what information should they
get?” (Rosenbloom, 2010, quoting Astin,
A., 1992, pp. 255-260). The Rosenbloom
analysis suggested a neutral outside entity
be used to publish information about all
participating schools using standardized
language to describe course offerings, aca-
demic focus, and statistics. 
Recommendations
The IDOE should, from the outset, create,
maintain, and monitor information and sta-
tistics for all Indiana schools — both public
and private — so parents may make
informed decisions for their children’s edu-
cation. Uniform regulations or guidelines
should also be created which provide firm
parameters for schools’ reporting of curric-
ulum offerings, testing results, discipline
procedures and statistics, and other aspects
of schools’ cultures which may be relevant
to discerning parents.
Conclusion
In order to be relevant, any school choice
research platform should (a) be longitudi-
nal and randomized, (b) study factors
within individual schools causing positive
and negative achievement results, (c) mon-
itor changes in students’ civic knowledge
and involvement, and (d) monitor any pos-
itive or negative impacts in the communi-
ties immediately surrounding schools
impacted by school choice.
Recommendations
The issues and controversies surrounding
school choice are endless, and passionate
advocacy often blurs the line between fact
and fiction, further complicating IDOE’s
efforts to implement Indiana’s school
choice statutes. The landscape will be fur-
ther complicated by legal challenges as well
as legislative debates over funding. By
enacting the most comprehensive school
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choice program in the country, Indiana has
been thrust into the spotlight and will be
intensely scrutinized by education policy
advocates and scholars nationwide. As
Indiana is observed by the nation, it is criti-
cal for those at the helm to forge ahead and
make decisions based on objective data,
hopefully procured by the IDOE’s engage-
ment of an independent research entity to
conduct longitudinal random assignment
studies and other assessments on the effects
of school choice on Indiana’s students, fam-
ilies, schools, and communities.
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